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ABSTRACT
Items in social media such as photos may be co-owned by
multiple users, i.e., the sharing decisions of the ones who up-
load them have the potential to harm the privacy of the others.
Previous works uncovered coping strategies by co-owners to
manage their privacy, but mainly focused on general prac-
tices and experiences. We establish an empirical base for the
prevalence, context and severity of privacy conflicts over co-
owned photos. To this aim, a parallel survey of pre-screened
496 uploaders and 537 co-owners collected occurrences and
type of conflicts over co-owned photos, and any actions taken
towards resolving them. We uncover nuances and complex-
ities not known before, including co-ownership types, and
divergences in the assessment of photo audiences. We also
find that an all-or-nothing approach seems to dominate con-
flict resolution, even when parties actually interact and talk
about the conflict. Finally, we derive key insights for design-
ing systems to mitigate these divergences and facilitate con-
sensus.
Author Keywords
Privacy; photo sharing; online social networks;
co-ownership; conflicts; social media
ACM Classification Keywords
K.4.1. Computers and Society: Privacy; H.5.m. Information
Interfaces and Presentation (e.g. HCI): Miscellaneous
INTRODUCTION
The interpersonal and multiparty nature of privacy was al-
ready identified in foundational privacy theories such as those
of Altman [2], Petronio [40], and Nissenbaum [37]. This very
nature was also acknowledged as critical to successfully un-
pack privacy in computer-mediated communications [38, 52].
Social media are computer-mediated communication infras-
tructures where multiparty privacy manifests, as many of the
hundreds of billions of items that are uploaded are co-owned
by multiple users [58, 23]. One particular manifestation is
what we call multiparty privacy conflicts (MPCs), which arise
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when the privacy preferences of the uploader and co-owners
of an item do not align. In this paper, we focus on photo
MPCs, i.e., MPCs caused by photos shared over social me-
dia. Take a very simple but illustrative example: Alice takes a
photo of her and her friends Bob and Charlie and then shares
it with others through social media. What if Alice (the up-
loader) sets the photo visible to all in the social media site but
Bob and Charlie (the co-owners) would have preferred to just
share among common friends?
Handling MPCs is an important part of users’ interpersonal
boundary regulation processes, and there are a number of
strategies users are known to utilise [31, 56, 13, 24]. These
strategies can be preventive (they aim to avoid MPCs) or cor-
rective (they aim to resolve MPCs when they happen); in-
dividual (each affected user can do something unilaterally)
or collaborative (all users potentially affected by a co-owned
item work together); and online (users make use of social me-
dia features) or offline (users apply strategies out of social
media). An example of a preventive, collaborative and offline
strategy is that users are known to sometimes negotiate with
whom a photo will be shared before uploading it to social
media [56], e.g., friends deciding the photos they take dur-
ing their holiday trip to only be shared online with common
friends. An example of a corrective, individual, and online
strategy would be when a user untags herself from a photo
uploaded to social media to try to prevent her friends from
seeing it [31, 13]. However, these strategies may not always
work or provide the desired outputs. For instance, untagging
oneself from a photo does not completely remove the possi-
bility of the photo being accessed anyway by the undesired
audience, and having to negotiate offline for each an every
co-owned item would be unfeasible due to the large number
of co-owned items and potential co-owners to deal with.
This has inspired researchers to tackle the problem of how
to design support for multi-privacy privacy, particularly by
looking to designing interfaces and computational methods
for users to manage MPCs in effective and efficient ways,
such as [4, 12, 21, 49, 47] as discussed below. However,
there is a lack of an empirical base that can help understand
when and how MPCs happen, and what is the best way of
preventing/resolving them. Even previous works that studied
the strategies users follow to cope with MPCs mainly focused
on general practices / experiences [31, 56, 13, 24].
In this paper, we present the first large-scale study of actual
photo MPCs, from identification of the MPC, to communi-
cation and/or resolution. Crucially, we look at photo MPCs
through the lens of the uploaders of co-owned items and co-
owners, as we are interested to see if there may be any dif-
ferences between these roles in terms of the information they
have about MPCs as well as their point of view and percep-
tions.
Contribution
The main contribution of this work is the large-scale, em-
pirical study of photo MPCs, including both uploaders and
co-owners. We also provide exemplary explorations of the
resulting dataset focusing on the research questions below.
Research Questions
Our main research questions are:
1. What are the characteristics of photo MPCs?
2. What is the frequency of communication and resolution
strategies, and their effectiveness for resolving MPCs?
3. Are there significant differences between uploaders and co-
owners in terms of MPC characteristics and communica-
tion/resolution strategies?
RELATED WORK
Previous research on multiparty privacy in social media can
be categorised into two main streams.
The first stream uncovered, studied and categorised some of
the strategies that users are known to use to deal with mul-
tiparty privacy in social media [31, 56, 13]. Lampinen et al.
[31] classified the strategies users employ into preventive or
corrective, and individual or collaborative. Boyd [6] showed
a particular instance of collaborative preventive strategy, dis-
covering and studying how teens share inside jokes and cloak
their messages so that any other social media users would
not be able to know the actual information teens are shar-
ing with each other. Wisniewski et al. [56] made a further
crucial distinction between the strategies which are in some
way facilitated by technology, which we refer to as online
(e.g., untagging), and strategies that are applied outside the
confines of social media infrastructures, which we refer to as
offline (e.g., negotiating the audience before posting). They
argued that people are more likely to apply offline mecha-
nisms rather than technological mechanisms, mainly due to
the lack of more appropriate built-in technological mecha-
nisms in social media infrastructures. Later on, Cho and Fil-
ippova [13] showed that reported strategy use seems to be
correlated to perceived efficacy by the individual and the par-
ticular group of co-owners in managing privacy. Also, it has
been suggested that users enact collaborative strategies based
on group perceptions of collective privacy risk, information
disclosure, and propensity to value privacy [24]; and that
privacy concerns seem to be negatively associated with en-
gaging with friends through tagging activities [57]. Finally,
Wisniewski et al. [55] studied the support mainstream so-
cial media interfaces provided to users, concluding that these
interfaces are ineffective, difficult to use and not easy to be
aware of, which leaves users no other option than to apply of-
fline coping strategies. While the studies presented above are
foundational in nature and significantly contributed to the un-
derstanding of the problem, they mainly focused on reported
general practices. Our study is aimed to complement these
studies by providing a large-scale and empirical study of par-
ticular cases of MPCs, from the perspective of both uploaders
and co-owners.
The second stream focused on designing interfaces and com-
putational mechanisms for supporting multiparty privacy
management. Some of these works provide some support for
users to resolve MPCs [4, 46]. For example, Besmer and
Lipford [4] studied photo tagging and untagging behaviours
on Facebook, and proposed a system whereby a user tagged
in a photo could send privacy suggestions to the poster. In
general, uploaders were very accommodating of the concerns
of co-owners, and there was a perception that images posted
online were co-owned between those represented within the
photograph. Other approaches automatically aggregate indi-
vidual privacy preferences to come up with a collective shar-
ing policy [12, 21, 49, 47], but the methods used to do so
are rarely based on evidence of what users would consider as
the best sharing policy for a given situation. There have also
been works that propose game-theoretic negotiation mech-
anisms, in which users [22] or automated software agents
[48] negotiate a solution to multiparty privacy conflicts fol-
lowing an established protocol. Both the protocol and ne-
gotiation strategies are analysed using game-theoretic solu-
tion concepts such as the Nash equilibrium. However, such
proposals may not work well in practice since the underly-
ing assumption that users behave in a perfectly rational way
may not capture the social idiosyncrasies that users seem to
consider when sharing and managing privacy in social media
[31, 56]. Finally, Illia et al. [23] presented a mechanism to
enforce fine-grained access control in photos by blurring the
faces of the users depicted in the photo based on each users’
access control list. While multiparty privacy management
methods and tools are starting to provide alternatives to the
coping techniques adopted by users who are faced with ex-
isting system constraints, as a community we still lack more
evidence upon which to base the design of these systems. The
overarching goal of the present research is to provide such an
evidence base.
METHOD
We studied specific multiparty privacy conflicts over co-
owned photos in social media using a critical incident method
[18] as detailed below, inspired by previous works that had
successfully used a similar methodology to collect and study
specific experiences of users updating software [51], and se-
curity incidents [42].
Survey Instruments
Two questionnaires were designed to be almost identical with
small variations/wordings to adapt them to those that had ei-
ther shared a photograph that led to a MPC (uploaders) or
to co-owners who had been involved in MPCs. The two
survey questionnaires contained around thirty questions each
(see appendix). Then, the guidelines for the critical incident
technique were followed to ask for the most recent observa-
tion [18] (i.e., the last time participants experienced a MPC),
in order to prevent biasing the study to just the more dra-
matic or vivid incidents, or some other selected group, such
as those which fit the participant’s stereotypes. Specifically,
a set of closed- and open-ended questions asked, depending
on the role, about: a) the last photo they shared that caused
an MPC (uploaders); or b) the last photo of themselves shared
by someone else that caused a MPC (co-owners). These ques-
tions were semi-structured following the known stages of in-
terpersonal conflicts [17]: conflict identification, communi-
cation and resolution. In particular, we asked about the con-
text of the photo [37], to understand what was in it, who was
in it, relationships between people, the audience with which
the photo was shared, the self-assessed severity of the MPC;
the nature of any communications between uploaders and co-
owners about the MPC; and the approach followed to try to
resolve the MPC, and whether the MPC was considered to
be resolved or not. Finally, we also asked at the end about
the general multiparty sharing practices taken from related
literature [31, 56, 13], but also allowing participants to report
specific ways in which they prevent/resolve MPCs, together
with demographics, and photo taking and social media use.
After the study was approved by the IRB board at Lancaster
University, Amazon Mechanical Turk was used to administer
the questionnaires to participants. Two pre-tests were con-
ducted first using a small sample of 50 turkers each time to
get feedback and refine the two questionnaires. The final ver-
sions of the survey were administered to 1080 turkers. Par-
ticipants were initially shown with screening questions with
eligibility criteria (being user of at least one social sharing
platform, having taken photos over the last 30 months, and
having shared photos through sharing platforms), and an in-
formed consent statement they needed to accept. After this,
participants were randomly assigned to the uploaders or co-
owners version of the questionnaire. It took an average of
12 minutes to complete the survey and participants were paid
$3.50, which means an hourly pay of $17.82, above the mini-
mum average wage of $7.25 mandated by the US federal gov-
ernment and the maximum per-state minimum average wage
of $10.50.
Data Reliability and Coding Process
Well-known quality-assurance processes were followed when
administering the survey instrument through Amazon Me-
chanical Turk [9, 39, 35, 20], including attention check ques-
tions, and selection of US-based participants with at least 50
tasks completed on MTurk and a success rate of at least 95%.
For open-ended questions, the data analysis used open cod-
ing on the qualitative responses. This was closely followed
by the labelling of data with active, specific codes [1]. In
particular, a collaborative coding process was followed for
this initial stage [43]. One lead coder developed an initial
version of the code book, which then was handed to a sec-
ond coder who independently and blindly (without knowing
how the other coder had coded the data) coded the data again.
Cohen’s kappa was used to measure intercoder agreement be-
tween the codes that each coder had assigned independently
and blindly for each response to each open-ended question,
with values of at least 0.7 for all questions, and with some
questions that were over 0.8, both values showing a high to
very high degree of agreement between the coders. After this
double-blind step, a second step was conducted in which, for
every disagreement found between the two coders, both of
them worked collaboratively to either refine the code book if
the disagreement was attributed to an inconsistency in it, or
to reach an agreement on the most appropriate code for the
disagreement found [33]. When open coding was finished,
the second stage was selective coding, when codes that rep-
resented similar concepts were collated into overarching cat-
egories, then closely examined for inter-significance to pro-
duce a set of themes grounded on the data [8], some of which
are preliminarily explored within this study according to the
research questions stated above.
RESULTS
Participants
1080 participants submitted the questionnaire, 9 failed at least
one of the attention checks, 32 had straight lining responses,
and 6 reported a privacy violation but nothing to do with mul-
tiparty privacy. These cases were removed from the dataset,
and the remaining 1033 (96%) were assessed, including 496
uploaders and 537 co-owners. Table 1 shows demographics
and other descriptive statistics.
Range Value %
Age 18-19 19 2%
20-29 454 44%
30-39 335 32%
40-49 139 13%
50-59 69 7%
60-69 17 2%
Gender Male 516 50.0%
Female 512 49.5%
Other/N/A 5 0.5%
Mean Median Std.Dev.
Close friends 8.46 5.00 45.67
Online contacts 443.89 218.00 1013.85
Hours spent online / day 6.36 5.00 4.60
Photos taken last 30 days 65.36 27.00 124.04
with 1+ people 33.09 10.00 77.94
shared with others 16.52 5.00 43.86
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of participants.
We also asked frequencies over the last 2 months in which
either co-owners were happy/unhappy photos of them were
shared by others, or uploaders perceived co-owners being
happy/unhappy about photos they shared. The results in Table
2 show both uploaders and co-owners were in general happier
than unhappier about multiparty sharing, so participants seem
not to be negatively biased against it, which is in line with pre-
vious research on the benefits users experience when sharing
in social media [25, 29, 10].
Co-owner Uploader
# Times Happy Unhappy Happy Unhappy
0 31% 47% 27% 61%
1 10% 32% 7% 32%
2 10% 12% 8% 4%
3 5% 5% 3% 1%
4 2% 1% 3% 0%
5+ 42% 3% 52% 2%
Table 2. Number of times over the last 2 months in which: i) co-owners
were happy/unhappy a photo of them was shared, and ii) uploaders per-
ceived co-owners to be happy/unhappy of the photos their shared.
We also wanted to understand the general practises in multi-
party sharing scenarios of our participants beyond the specific
Co-owner Uploader
General photo taking/sharing practices
Multiple accounts to share separately N/A 83 (17%)
Same account to share personal and work N/A 243 (49%)
Negotiate rules of thumb for sharing 272 (51%) 288 (58%)
Restrict general privacy settings 445 (83%) 422 (85%)
Problematic photos not shared 417 (78%) 440 (89%)
Share via private message / e-mail 410 (76%) 416 (84%)
Share via private cloud storage 259 (48%) 202 (41%)
Share via Snapchat/photo-vanishing app 163 (30%) 142 (29%)
Change offline behaviour to avoid photo 286 (53%) N/A
No photo if someone avoiding camera N/A 412 (82%)
General practices before posting a photo
Consider others N/A 127 (25.6%)
Request permission N/A 127 (26.5%)
Selective/restrictive sharing N/A 132 (26.6%)
Tag approval 31 (5.8%) N/A
Decide not to share (or ask not to) 123(22.9%) 59 (12.9%)
General practices after a conflicting photo was posted
Ignore conflicts 86 (17%) 25 (6%)
Converse with the other party 156 (30%) 44 (10%)
Remove the photo (or ask to) 231 (43%) 303 (68%)
Restrict access to the photo (or ask to) 15 (2.8%) 15 (3%)
Untag from the photo 87 (17%) 15 (3%)
Unfriend/block the other party 4 (0.7%) 4(1%)
Table 3. General reported practices for multiparty sharing and to pre-
vent/resolve multiparty privacy conflicts.
instance of MPC they reported. To this end, we presented
participants with a list of general practises based on previ-
ous research [31, 56, 13, 24], as well as allowing them to
report any other general practices they usually follow before
and after posting a photo to prevent/resolve MPCs. The re-
sults from this part of the survey are shown in Table 3. Note,
that although we present these results first to characterise our
participants, the questions were actually shown at the end of
the survey to avoid biasing what participants would report for
the particular MPC — see appendix.
Characteristics of Photo MPCs
In this section we focus on answering RQ1. Also, note cor-
relation coefficients were calculated for characteristics from
closed questions to all other closed questions and they were
not statistically significant unless explicitly stated otherwise
below. A Bonferroni correction for the significances was used
to adjust for multiple tests (a total of 61, including correla-
tions and the other tests described later on) to minimise Type
1 errors. The resulting cut-off significance level for correla-
tions as well as for the other tests shown in the paper was
α = 0.05/61 = 0.00082.
Prevalence
The vast majority of participants (99.3%) reported a multi-
party privacy conflict. In particular, 30% of participants ex-
perienced their last conflict within 1 month of the survey date,
44% within 6 months, and 66% within 12 months. There was
no significant difference between uploaders and co-owners in
this regard. The results indicate conflicts are likely to oc-
cur more often around key holiday dates such as Halloween,
Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year, which can also be
attributed to an increase in photo taking/uploading during the
days around these events. For instance, Figure 1 represents
the 4 month period leading up to the close of the study, where
we can observe clear spikes around those dates. However, we
can also see spikes very close to the date of the study, which,
after analysis, were clearly not related at all to any of the hol-
iday dates, suggesting relatively high frequency of conflicts
in the day-to-day sharing as well.
Figure 1. Number of MPCs during the 4 months before administering
the survey.
The majority of photos that led to conflicts were shared on
Facebook (80.8%), Instagram (5.4%), Snapchat (1.4%), and
Twitter (1.3%). Other photo sharing platforms such as imgur,
Flickr, MySpace, and Tumblr were used but individually rep-
resented less than 1% of the study.
Content
Regarding the content of the conflicting photos, 4.3% con-
tained no person (e.g., landscape or object), 13.6% had 1 per-
son, 32.7% had 2 people, 18.2% had 3 people, and 31.3% had
4 or more.
Regarding the relationships between the depicted peo-
ple in the photo (when more than one person), fam-
ily made up 41.36%, friends 40.20%, relationships such
as boyfriend/girlfriend 9.29%, acquaintances 4.06%, ex-
partners 2.47%, co-workers 2.32%, and others 0.29%.
Regarding specific topics specified by respondents (60%
of MPCs), they included people drinking or being drunk
(23.57%), old photos from the past (10.27%), children
(7.41%), people eating or food-related photos (6.23%), peo-
ple playing around such as making faces (6.06%), intimate
photos or photos with some degree of nudity (4.04%), people
sleeping (2.86%), selfies (2.56%), photos taken off the sub-
jects’ guard (2.36%), people having just got up or with pa-
jamas on (2.36%), people in costumes (1.52%), people cele-
brating (1.52%), photos taken with poor-quality (1.52%), etc.
Regarding specific events specified by respondents (54% of
MPCs), it related to parties (31.52%), including birthdays
(11%), new year (7.22%), Thanksgiving and 4th July celebra-
tions (3.6%), and non date-specific parties (13.37%). Christ-
mas (15.50%), vacations (10.09%), meals and gatherings
(8.65%), weddings (3.6%), sport events (3.24%), Halloween
events (3.24%), graduations (2.6%), and concerts (1.62%)
also contributed to occasions that were explicitly cited as
times in which conflicting photos had been taken at.
Severity
Participants were asked to identify on a Likert scale how se-
vere the conflict was, with 5 being very severe and 1 not se-
vere. Table 4 represents the number of conflicts and sever-
ity, showing a very similar pattern for both uploaders and co-
owners of fewer cases as the severity increases.
In terms of contexts and content for which conflicts are per-
ceived to be more severe than others (levels 4 and 5), there
Not
Severe
Very
Severe
Severity 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Uploader 184
(37.1%)
165
(33.2%)
99
(20.0%)
44
(8.9%)
4
(0.8%)
496
(100%)
Co-owner 189
(35.2%)
190
(35.4%)
107
(19.9%)
44
(8.2%)
8
(1.3%)
537
(100%)
Table 4. Respondents’ perceived severity of conflicts.
was a predominance of drink-, party-, and friend-related con-
tents, with some familiar and ex-* relationships also appear-
ing. In terms of relationship closeness, we could find exam-
ples of varying relationship closeness at all levels of severity,
e.g., “he is my husband we are/were very close” (P407u); “he
is my cousin” (P502c); “friend, from high school” (P338u).
Finally, the gender of the respondent (r = 0.12, p < 0.00005)
was significantly correlated with severity.
Process of Photo MPCs
Now, we focus on RQ2, i.e., what is the frequency of com-
munication and resolution strategies, and their effectiveness
for resolving MPCs.
Communication before sharing
Regarding communication before posting, 57.3% of upload-
ers stated that they had not asked for any kind of feedback
or permission from co-owners, 32.7% had not asked for feed-
back or permission but later regretted not doing so, 6.5% had
asked everyone before sharing the photo, 2.6% asked some of
the people represented, and 1.0% asked someone that was not
in the photo, such as “I asked his mother if she would mind
me sharing it” (P88u). When co-owners were asked whether
they had been approached for feedback or permission before
a photograph was shared, 96% stated no, and only 4% re-
ported that they had been asked for feedback and/or permis-
sion. Thus, asking for feedback/permission before posting
was very rare regardless of the group being asked.
Communication after sharing
We focus now on what happened after a photo was shared. In
general, complaints related to individual privacy issues and
confirmed previous observations in multiparty scenarios [4,
31], with three main overarching themes: self-presentation
issues [45], context collapse [5], and controlling who has ac-
cess and when [56, 24]. Regarding how the complaints were
made, we found: in person (38.8%), texting (20.4%), online
(17.6%), telephoning (9.6%), messaging through apps such
as whatsapp (7.3%), email (3.8%), and other (2.3%).
For uploaders, all the reported MPCs described a situation
in which co-owners did express their discontent. The major-
ity, 74%, of complaints were made by a person depicted in
the photo. Complaints reported by someone not in the photo
amounted 23%, and they included people who complained
about someone they felt responsible for or about something
of them that was shown in the photo. One example was par-
ents complaining about a photo of their children: “[It was]
a picture of my child holding a piece of paper ... my hus-
band complained that i should have asked before submitting
the photo” (P50u). Another example was people complain-
ing about their house, room, car, pet and so on: “It was a
picture out the front windshield of a friend’s vehicle from
when we went storm chasing, and the windshield is cracked.
My friend felt embarrassed about the aforementioned cracks
in the windshield, he thought it made him look bad” (P3u).
There were also a small number of MPCs in which someone
complained after being tagged but without being depicted in
the photo: “It was a photo of a crab on a beach. I [...] tagged
a friend in it. It’s a longstanding joke that I call her crablady
and started a rumor that she has crabs” (P277u). Finally,
very few uploaders reported the photo being flagged to the
social media provider (1.6%), and 3% of uploaders claimed
not to have received a complaint, as they got to know about
the conflict when they contacted co-owners before sharing the
photo.
For co-owners, there were two main cases, either they did
or did not communicate their unhappiness with the photo
to uploaders. In particular, 46.8% of co-owners complained
about the photo they were unhappy about while the remain-
ing 53.2% did not. When co-owners did complain, 95% ad-
dressed directly the person who uploaded the photo after it
was shared, and 5% of complaints were directed towards the
provider of the website or application, though no association
with severity was noted. There was a significant correlation
between the severity of the conflict and whether co-owners
complained or not (r = 0.3, p < 0.00001).
For the 53.2% co-owners who did not complain about a photo
they were unhappy about, 33.9% stated that they did not
wish to upset both the person who published the photo, nor
those represented in the photo, e.g., “too awkward, didn’t
want to get on people’s bad side” (P698c). Of the remain-
ing co-owners who did not complain, 25.0% did not con-
sider it worth complaining; 12.1% thought complaining was
petty, would cause additional attention, or would be consid-
ered vain; 7.3% thought it was too late once the photo had
been published; 3.2% suggested complaining would compli-
cate other people’s ability to share the photo; and 5.6% had
already been approached for feedback.
Conflict Resolution
Table 5 shows all the conflict resolution strategies and
whether the MPC was considered to be resolved or not bro-
ken down by the reporter, i.e., uploader or co-owner. Also,
we split co-owners into co-owners who did complain and
co-owners who did not complain. We can clearly see that
there is a relationship between the conflict resolution strategy
and whether or not the MPC was perceived to be resolved
regardless of the reporter, which is significant (χ2 = 667,
p < 0.0001).
An interesting observation from Table 5 (columns for All) is
that there is a large majority of cases (around 75%) in which
the conflict resolution was either removing the photo or doing
nothing about it, which shows a very all-or-nothing approach
for conflict resolution. However, the difference between these
two main strategies is their effectiveness. In particular, re-
moving the photo was perceived to always resolve the con-
flict in all 338 cases that were reported by both uploaders and
co-owners. In contrast, doing nothing was perceived not to
resolve a conflict around 70% of the time, though there are
Co-owner (complain:no) Co-owner (complain:yes) Uploader All
Resolved Resolved Resolved Resolved
Strategy Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No Total
Apologised 6 1 7 29 2 31 35 3 38
Converse 6 6 24 24 30 30
Converse (flattery) 1 1 17 17 17 1 18
Agreed before sharing 3 3 1 1 4 4 8 8
Forfeit 1 1 1 1
Seek permission 10 10 11 11 21 21
Stopped sharing 1 1 1 1
Remove 129 129 209 209 338 338
Remove from timeline 5 5 5 5
Replace (another) 6 6 14 14 20 20
Replace (blur) 1 1 1 1
Replace (crop) 1 1 9 9 10 10
Photo vanished 1 1 1 1
Restrict access 3 3 1 1 8 8 4 8 12
Untag (uploader) 2 2 3 3 16 16 5 16 21
Untag (co-owner) 36 4 40 7 1 8 3 3 46 5 51
Did nothing (uploader) 18 63 81 77 62 139 95 125 220
Did nothing (co-owner) 47 174 221 47 174 221
Blocked 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 6
Unfriend (uploader) 4 4 4 4
Unfriend (co-owner) 1 1 2 2 1 2 3
Not speaking 2 2 1 1 3 3
Changed offline 1 1 1 1
Grand Total 101 179 280 191 66 257 430 66 496 722 311 1033
Table 5. Contingency table with # times each conflict resolution strategy was observed and whether or not it resolved the conflict.
slight differences here between uploaders and co-owners that
we discuss more in-depth in the next section.
For the remaining approaches to conflict resolution (25% all
together), we found a lot of variety, with a significant amount
of people apologising, and others just conversing with the co-
owners. These conversations had either an element of allevi-
ating co-owners concern, e.g., “I had a good talk and laugh
with the person” (P166u), very often including elements of
persuasion to make think co-owners it was all right and no
action was required. One particular type of persuasive strat-
egy very common within the converse category (and hence
we show the results for this separated) was flattery. For in-
stance “I reminded her how beautiful she is and pointed out
the tons of comments confirming this” (P14u). In some other
cases, there was an explicit promise made from uploaders to
co-owners that they would seek their permission before post-
ing in the future, that they would not share again a photo of
the co-owner, or there was one case of compensation in the
form of a forfeit.
There were also some resolutions that were alternatives to re-
moving. In particular, there were cases in which uploaders
replaced the photo with another one of the same people (even
in the same event sometimes), they cropped the co-owners
out, or blurred faces. These strategies are interesting, as they
are alternative ways of resolving an MPC that seek a com-
promise between what the uploader and co-owners want —
as opposed to the more prevalent all-or-nothing approach de-
scribed above. Another interesting resolution approach was
that a photo shared using snapchat vanished after a while, re-
solving the conflict but also letting co-owners to talk about
the photo and avoiding it from uploading to other social me-
dia platforms.
Other approaches to find a compromise included restricting
access to the photo, or the uploader or co-owner removing
the tag in an attempt to restrict access to the photo. More rad-
ical but hardly applied approaches were to block, unfriend, or
stop speaking with the co-owners who complained. Impor-
tantly, these type of strategies were applied most of the time
when the relationship between uploaders and co-owners was
distant, which might be related to distant relationships being
perceived as less important to maintain. Other than this, there
were no other apparent correlations between relationships and
strategies used.
Finally, there were was a significant association between the
strategy being used and the severity (χ2 = 146.395, p =
0.00081). In particular, Figure 2 shows that the higher the
severity the more times a photo was removed. Also, there
seems to be an interesting trend, which is that doing nothing
happens more often than removing for the least severe items
but then the inverse happens as severity increases. However,
we can see cases of doing nothing at all levels, and even at the
highest severity level, over 40% of the cases are solved this
way.
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Figure 2. Percentage of strategy use (X axis) per Severity level (Y axis).
Differences between uploaders and co-owners
We finally show the results obtained regarding RQ3, focus-
ing on the differences between uploaders and co-owners that
were found to be significant.
Divergence in perceived audience
Uploaders reported that 72% of the photos were shared with
friends, 15% with public, and 1% did not know. In con-
trast, co-owners reported 47% of the photos were shared with
friends, 34% with public, and 10% did not know. The dis-
parity between groups was also apparent regarding the num-
ber of people perceived to have access to the photo, with a
median of 200 for uploaders and 250 for co-owners; as well
as people perceived to had looked at the photo, with me-
dian of 30 for uploaders and 50 for co-owners. Means and
SDs were orders of magnitude higher than medians, which
pointed to many outliers and answers not being normally dis-
tributed, but values were always much higher for co-owners
than for uploaders. A Kruskal-Wallis test [30], which is a
non-parametric extension of one-way ANOVA for data that
may not be normally-distributed, was used to compare the
values of uploaders and co-owners for how many people had
access to the photo (χ2 = 17.56, p < 0.00005) and how many
people looked at it (χ2 = 30.17, p < 0.00001), finding signif-
icant differences between groups in both cases.
Differences in perceptions of conflict resolution
Figure 3 shows that, overall, 70% of conflicts were resolved
and 30% remained unresolved even after a conversation be-
tween the affected parties. However, we could again ob-
serve clear discrepancies between uploaders and co-owners,
which a chi-squared test confirmed to be statistically signifi-
cant (χ2 = 129.75, p < 0.00001). Uploaders considered 86%
of issues resolved compared to only 54% of co-owners. How-
ever, recall from above that many co-owners did not complain
(53% of them). When co-owners did not complain, 36% of
the conflicts were considered resolved and 64% unresolved.
In contrast, when co-owners did complain, 74% of the con-
flicts were considered resolved and 26% unresolved. There-
fore, conflict communication plays and important role for a
conflict to be resolved or not, which is consistent with cur-
rent conflict resolution theories [17]. We can see that when
co-owners complain the perceptions of the conflict being re-
solved or not are closer to those of uploaders. However, even
if we just take the co-owners who complained, the differ-
ences are still statistically significant between uploaders and
co-owners as confirmed by a chi-squared test (χ2 = 16.34,
p < 0.00005), pointing to other factors that influence those
differences beyond complaining/not-complaining. This di-
vergence can be observed in Table 5 regarding uploaders do-
ing nothing about a conflict. We can see that co-owners con-
sider the conflict not to be resolved when uploaders did noth-
ing about it in the majority of cases (78%), while uploaders
only consider the conflict not to be resolved when they do
nothing about it in less than 44% of the cases.
Differences in conflict resolution strategies
Beyond the similarities of uploaders and co-owners when it
comes to frequencies of use of conflict resolution strategies
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Figure 3. Whether or not MPCs were resolved by group and whether
co-owners complained.
already stated above, there were also some statistically sig-
nificant differences on the strategies used by uploaders and
co-owners (χ2 = 482, p < 0.00001). Looking back at Table
5, it is already apparent the differences between removing the
photo and doing nothing (which together account for 75% of
cases) depending on the role. Interestingly enough, these dif-
ferences are more apparent if we further split co-owners into
those who complained and those who did not. In particular,
Table 5 (columns for co-owners) show that most co-owners
who did not complain ended up doing nothing about the con-
flict, which actually shows as leaving the conflict unresolved
in the vast majority of cases (almost 80%) — note that if co-
owners did not express their discontent to or ask uploaders
about what to do directly, there are strategies that were not
available to them, e.g., the photo would not be removed as
the only one able to take a photo down is the one who up-
loaded it. In contrast, co-owners who did complain, they did
something about the MPC, and it was the uploader who may
or may not have done anything about the MPC.
Another strategy where differences were found was untag-
ging. In particular, co-owners seemed to use it more often
than uploaders (χ2 = 95.89, p < 0.00001). On a closer
look, however, there seems to be again differences within
co-owners depending on whether they did complain or not
(χ2 = 14.67, p < 0.0005). If co-owners did not complain,
there was little left for them to do unilaterally but untagging
from the photo, or trying other means of restricting access,
such as hiding the photo from the timeline without remov-
ing the tag. Once a co-owner complained, untagging was
used much less than when a co-owner did not complain. Still,
we could observe that untagging is sometimes used as a way
of trying to hide the photo from potential undesired viewers.
However, some of the users understand this does not com-
pletely resolve a conflict, e.g., “The issue was not entirely
resolved. I untagged myself from the photo, but the photo re-
mained online” (P845c).
DISCUSSION
We now discuss the main implications for design and for fu-
ture research that stemmed from the results, particularly dis-
cussing and comparing to existing work in the area of multi-
party privacy.
When is a photo co-owned?
In the majority of cases, co-ownership was somewhat clear,
e.g., the people depicted in a photo could be considered the
co-owners, and they felt entitled to upload/share the photo or
to complain/contact the uploader as co-owners if they were
unhappy about the photo. However, there were many other
types of co-ownership. One type was uploaders being co-
owners despite not being themselves in the photo, as the au-
thors and posters of the photo online. There were also co-
owners who were not in the photo themselves, yet something
of them was in the photo (car, house, room, pet) or someone
they felt responsible for (e.g. their children), even when they
may not be tagged in the photo either. There were also cases
in which, despite being tagged in a photo, co-owners were not
depicted in the photo but a reference was made to them (e.g.
the crabs lady case discussed before). In other cases, upload-
ers intentionally avoided tagging someone in the photo as an
attempt to hide the photo from them.
Understanding co-ownership is crucial to design tools for
managing co-owned items as suggested earlier too [24].
However, our study uncovered co-ownership is a complex
phenomenon with different manifestations, and engineering
systems that are capable of being aware of co-owned items
need to consider this complexity. Further research is needed
on this topic, as most of the existing frameworks for multi-
party access control [4, 46, 12, 21, 48, 49, 47, 22] start from
the underlying assumption that the co-owners of an item are
known in advance.
Friends and Family are danger
MPCs were reported much more often related to close rela-
tionships between friends (including best and close friends)
and family (including siblings, parents, etc.), rather than more
distant relationships such as acquaintances and co-workers,
which together represented only 5% of the cases (see Char-
acteristics of Photo MPCs). This was already suggested in
[4] and our work quantitatively confirmed it. This, however,
contrasts with previous research that suggested that trusted
relationships may be an antidote for MPCs [13, 31]. What
we found, however, is that even in very trusted relationships
(wife/husband) privacy conflicts do exist and are not always
resolved. One of the reasons that could explain the mismatch
with previous results is that, as already anticipated in [31]
and confirmed by our participants (53% of co-owners stated
they would change their offline behavior to avoid a photo),
users do consider the consequences in the online world and
behave differently in the offline world, particularly in situa-
tions with less trusted people, e.g., “I don’t allow untrustwor-
thy people to take photos of me” (P828c). This is also known
as the extended chilling effect of online social networks in
the off-line world [34]. This suggests there may be less op-
portunities for conflict with untrusted relationships, as offline
interactions with untrusted people are controlled more tightly
and less photos may be taken with them.
Audience Awareness
We observed a significant difference in the perceived audi-
ence of conflicting photos depending on the role. In particu-
lar, uploaders claimed to know who the audience was, stated
the audience not to be the public, and reported less people
looking at the conflicting photo. Although it is very well-
known in the literature that users’ perceptions of the audience
are never accurate [3], it suggests that co-owners perceive the
audience to be larger than uploaders. Importantly, the antic-
ipated audience is known to influence very much disclosure
decisions [26]. Audience visualisation tools could be used
so that not only uploaders but also co-owners could have ac-
cess to who the audience is for a particular photo. This would
have the potential to reduce audience perception mismatch
between co-owners and uploaders, and hence, help reduce the
perceived privacy threat a photo may pose to them. Examples
of such tools include AudienceView [32] and PViz [36].
Designing for minimally-intrusive pre-sharing interfaces
In the vast majority of cases (90%), MPCs were dealt with
after a photo had been shared (see Process of Photo MPCs
above). This has the drawback that conflict resolution hap-
pens after a privacy violation may have already happened.
Indeed, a prevalent emerging theme from the coded free-
text data in our study was a sense that the damage surround-
ing conflicts had already been done, and could not be recti-
fied. There were preventative strategies uploaders reported to
avoid conflicts in general, such as negotiating general rules of
thumb for sharing (around 58%) or considering others before
sharing (30%). However, even when participants explicitly
reported having considered others before the particular MPC
they reported, they were not able to predict whether/what co-
owners would complain about. The need for support before
sharing was acknowledged in previous research [31], but no
specific recommendations were given for design. Based on
our study, we suggest below three main avenues for future
research in this area.
The first avenue could be context-aware nudges that help
users manage multiparty sharing in particular scenarios, as
our study revealed that there are dates, events, places, topics
and relationships that seem to favour the emergence of MPCs
(see Characteristics of MPCs above). In this sense, context-
aware mechanisms [44] could be used to focus nudges similar
to those described in [54, 53] on particular contexts. Another
approach could be to learn users’ behaviour in particular con-
texts and social groups and make recommendations for other
but similar contexts and social groups [11, 15].
The second avenue would be to explore the potential of re-
stricted audience previews among co-owners before a photo
is shared. This stems from: i) uploaders and co-owners
perceived audience significantly different and would bene-
fit from audience awareness mechanisms as already men-
tioned, and ii) some participants reported MPCs within a re-
stricted audience in one social media infrastructure, which
acted as a kind of firewall, preventing uploaders from posting
the conflicting photo to other social media — e.g., a partic-
ipant reported an MPC using Snapchat with a reduced audi-
ence, which resulted in the photo not being posted to Face-
book. The audience visualisation tools already discussed be-
fore could also be helpful here to preview the prospective au-
dience before sharing a photo.
The third avenue is support for conflict resolution, detailed in
the next section, which could equally be used before or after
sharing, depending on when the MPC is discovered.
Designing to facilitate compromise
Previous works encouraged the development of built-in capa-
bilities for social media to facilitate a discussion between up-
loaders and co-owners [4, 31, 56]. However, what we found
in our study is that a discussion may not be enough, as when
actual negotiations happened (when uploader and co-owners
communicated), there was little or no room given for com-
promise, and the photo was either removed or nothing was
done about it in 75% of the MPCs reported in a very all-or-
nothing approach. This could be related to the lack of aware-
ness about other alternatives [55]. Therefore, while we are
not suggesting that conflicts are always resolvable [41, 50],
interfaces should show and facilitate the application of alter-
native conflict resolution actions to compromise and, hence,
reach agreement beyond just removing or doing nothing.
The other reason for alternative conflict resolution mecha-
nisms that facilitate compromise relate to the issue of whether
participants complained or not about a conflict. In particular,
participants showed a preference for direct methods to com-
plain (e.g., in person, via telephone, etc.), which is in line with
earlier evidence [56]. However, having to deal with MPCs di-
rectly is actually what put many co-owners off complaining
(e.g., not to upset others, to avoid further attention, etc.). That
is, if co-owners decided to complain, they were most likely to
do it in a direct way, but there were many co-owners who
decided not to complain precisely to avoid this direct interac-
tion.
One could be tempted to suggest untagging as one of those al-
ternative resolution approaches. However, when we observed
the use of untagging, it was mainly as a last resort not a com-
promise, which was many times an alternative to interaction,
and it was significantly reported more by co-owners who did
not complain than co-owners who did complain or than up-
loaders. Moreover, a prevalent theme was a misunderstanding
of what was achieved by untagging, and we only few partici-
pants who were knowledgeable about the limitations of such
an approach: “I will untag myself and make it so none of my
friends can see it, unless they are friend with the person that
posted it” (P897c). We give two examples of alternative con-
flict resolution strategies that we found in the study that could
help find a compromise.
The first one is audience negotiation. Restricting the audi-
ence of a photo was shown as one of the conflict resolution
strategies participants enacted that always resolved a conflict.
Some interfaces have been proposed to collaboratively select
audiences, such as [46, 22]. However, the problem they have
relate to the effort needed from users as well as the very di-
rect approach followed. In contrast, other more automated
approaches like [12, 21, 47, 49] aggregate the preferred audi-
ences of all co-owners using pre-defined rules, which may not
hold or render acceptable results in all situations. Therefore,
the challenge for future research is to be able to recommend
a subset of the audience that makes all co-owners happy with
the minimal intervention possible, which could be then visu-
alised using the audience visualisation tools mentioned ear-
lier. Recommendations could be based on users’ preferences
and their reasons and/or simulated negotiations [19, 27].
The second refers to quick ways to replace/modify a conflict-
ing photo, e.g., a built-in option/interface in the social media
infrastructure to suggest another (non-conflicting) photo in
the same event, to blur someone’s face [23], to crop some peo-
ple out (there are apps that do this automatically), etc. These
were all conflict resolution strategies found in the study that
were always perceived to resolve the conflicts regardless of
whether participants were uploaders or co-owners, and par-
ticipants applied them even if social media infrastructures do
not provide built-in support for them yet.
Limitations and Further Work
As one of the usual practices for data reliability in MTurk,
only US-based participants were used [35, 20, 24]. Thus,
the results obtained might not generalise to other countries,
though recent work did not find significant differences be-
tween US and Singapore citizens when it came to general
multiparty privacy practices [13].
In line with previous research, we focused on photos for this
study. However, users also share other co-owned items in
social media, like posts, videos, events, etc. Beyond social
media, multiparty privacy should also be studied in smart
phones, augmented reality glasses [16], lifelogging [14, 28],
and digital health devices [7].
CONCLUSION
For the first time in the related literature, we studied par-
ticular Multiparty Privacy Conflicts (MPCs) over co-owned
photos from identification to resolution, using a survey de-
signed following a critical incident methodology to collect
photo MPCs from both uploaders and co-owners. This al-
lowed us to establish the first empirical basis for the preva-
lence, context and severity of photo MPCs. Also, we un-
covered nuances and complexities about MPCs not known
before, including: the different notions of what a co-owned
photo is and how it manifests in practice; that MPCs seem
to be more frequent in relationships closer than previously
thought but, at the same time, the most radical conflict reso-
lution approaches (e.g., unfriending) seem to be used in more
distant relationships; that uploaders and co-owners have sig-
nificantly different perceptions of the audience of a co-owned
photo; that more than half of the co-owners did not commu-
nicate with the uploaders about a MPC; that there is an all-
or-nothing approach of either removing the photo or doing
nothing about MPCs, which leads to many MPCs not being
resolved; and that there are other alternative strategies shown
to always resolve MPCs that could act as a compromise if
supported appropriately from social media interfaces. Based
on all of this, we derived key insights and specific implica-
tions to design next-generation multiparty privacy interfaces,
pointing to particular areas of interest for further research.
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APPENDIX
SURVEY QUESTIONS (uploaders’ version, see dataset for co-owners)
For the following questions, please think back to the last time someone was unhappy
about a personal photo of other people that you shared online (e.g., through Facebook
or flickr or other online platforms).
1. When was the last time someone was unhappy about a photo that you shared online?
If you cannot recall the exact date, please use an approximate date as close to the
event as you can remember.
2. What was shown in the photo and what was the photo about? (free text)
3. Were you shown in the photo yourself? (Y/N)
4. Were there other people shown in the photo?
• No, there was no person (photo of a landscape)
• No, only me
• Yes, one other person
• Yes, two other persons
• Yes, three or more other
5. On which Website or through which app did you share the photo? (free text)
6. Did you ask other people feedback or permission before sharing the photo?
• No
• No, but I wish I had
• Yes, I asked everyone in the photo
• Yes, I asked some of the people in the photo
• Yes, I only asked someone not in the photo
• Yes, I asked some of the people in the photo, and some additional people not in
the photo
7. If yes: How did you ask for feedback or permission? (free text)
8. How many times have you been abducted by aliens during the past 30 days? (atten-
tion check)
9. Who complained after you had shared the photo?
• The provider of the Website or app removed or flagged my photo. (Y/N)
• Someone in the photo complained. (Y/N)
• Someone not in the photo complained. (Y/N)
10. How did they complain?
• Online, directly on the photo (e.g., in the comments) (Y/N)
• By email (Y/N)
• By telephone (voice) (Y/N)
• By telephone (SMS, MMS) (Y/N)
• By messaging app (e.g., Whatsapp) (Y/N)
• In person (Y/N)
• Other (Y/N)
11. Why did they complain and what did they complain about? (free text)
12. What was your relationship with the person who complained? Please provide details
on how you knew them and how close you were. (free text)
13. Did you understand their concerns? (free text)
14. How severe was the issue? (Likert scale with 1-not severe and 5-very severe)
15. Was the issue resolved? (Y/N)
16. Have you seen a five-legged zebra hiding in your wallet? (attention check)
• Yes, once
• Yes, two or more times
• No
17. How was the issue resolved? (free text)
18. With whom did you share this photo initially?
• With no one
• With only one person
• With a few people I manually selected (e.g. by entering their names or email
addresses)
• With my friends or followers only
• With the public
• Don’t know/unsure
19. How many people ... If unsure, please make a guess
• could have had access to the photo?
• actually looked at the photo?
20. Have you later deleted the online photo or restricted who can see it?
• Yes, I deleted / restricted the photo less than a day later
• Yes, I deleted/restricted the photo less than a week later
• Yes, I deleted/restricted the photo more than a week later
• No, not this time, but I have deleted/restricted photos in the past
• No
• I don’t know
21. If the photo was shared through Facebook or similar, has any of the people in the
photo untagged from it?
• Yes
• No
• Not shared through Facebook or equivalent
• I don’t know
22. In general, how often over the last 2 months have people been ...
• unhappy you shared a certain photo or album?
• happy you shared a certain photo or album?
• complaining you shared a certain photo online?
23. In general, how do you prevent other people complaining who are unhappy about
the photos you share online? (free text)
24. In general, how do you manage privacy and public access to the photos you share
online? (Y/N for each)
• I create multiple accounts in one or more social networks (Facebook, Instagram,
flickr, etc.) to separate different audiences.
• I apply a rule of thumb in decisions on sharing (e.g., I have an agreement with my
friends that I will not photograph them during specific events, etc.)
• I adjust my privacy settings to only allow access to certain people (e.g., permis-
sions in Facebook only allow certain friends access, etc.)
• I avoid publicizing content that could be problematic (e.g., if I take photos of
friends who are drinking, I make sure that photos are not shared online.)
• I use Snapchat or a similar app in which shared photos vanish after a while.
• I use private communication channels (e.g., private messaging, email etc.)
• I use private cloud storage (e.g., I share my iCloud, Google Drive, OneDrive
account, etc.)
• I make sure I do not take photos of people when I see someone actively avoiding
my camera (e.g., I put my camera away if someone indicates to me that they do
not wish to be photographed.)
• I share personal and work photos through the same account (e.g., friends and
work colleagues can collectively see my photos.)
25. In general, how do you resolve it when other people complain or are unhappy about
the photos you share online? (free text)
26. Your gender
27. Your age
28. To what degree do the following statements apply to you personally? (Likert scale)
• If someone does me a favour, I am prepared to return it.
• If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what
the cost.
• If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her.
• I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before.
• If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back.
• I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.
• I get over it relatively quickly when someone hurts my feelings.
• When somebody has wronged me I often think about it for quite a while.
• I tend to bear grudges.
• When other people wrong me I try to just forgive and forget.
• I have a positive attitude toward myself.
29. How many close friends do you have?
30. Which platforms do you use to upload or share your photos? Please list all you use.
31. How many online contacts do you have in total across these photo sharing sites?
32. How many hours per day are you online?
33. If you have any comments on this survey or on online photo sharing in general,
please let us know. (optional, free text)
REFERENCES
1. P. Alasuutari, L. Bickman, and J. Brannen. The sage
handbook of social research methods. 2008.
2. I. Altman. The environment and social behavior:
Privacy, personal space, territory, and crowding. 1975.
3. M. S. Bernstein, E. Bakshy, M. Burke, and B. Karrer.
Quantifying the invisible audience in social networks. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, pages 21–30. ACM,
2013.
4. A. Besmer and H. Richter Lipford. Moving beyond
untagging: photo privacy in a tagged world. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, pages 1563–1572. ACM,
2010.
5. J. Binder, A. Howes, and A. Sutcliffe. The problem of
conflicting social spheres: effects of network structure
on experienced tension in social network sites. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors
in computing systems, pages 965–974. ACM, 2009.
6. D. Boyd and A. Marwick. Social steganography:
Privacy in networked publics. International
Communication Association, Boston, MA, 2011.
7. I. Brown, A. A. Adams, et al. The ethical challenges of
ubiquitous healthcare. International Review of
Information Ethics, 8(12):53–60, 2007.
8. A. Bryman. Social Research Methods. Oxford
University Press, New York, forth edition, 2012.
9. M. Buhrmester, T. Kwang, and S. D. Gosling. Amazon’s
mechanical turk a new source of inexpensive, yet
high-quality, data? Perspectives on psychological
science, 6(1):3–5, 2011.
10. M. Burke, C. Marlow, and T. Lento. Social network
activity and social well-being. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing
systems, pages 1909–1912. ACM, 2010.
11. G. Calikli, M. Law, A. K. Bandara, A. Russo,
L. Dickens, B. A. Price, A. Stuart, M. Levine, and
B. Nuseibeh. Privacy dynamics: Learning privacy norms
for social software. In Proceedings of the 11th
International Workshop on Software Engineering for
Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems, pages 47–56.
ACM, 2016.
12. B. Carminati and E. Ferrari. Collaborative access control
in on-line social networks. In IEEE CollaborateCom,
pages 231–240, 2011.
13. H. Cho and A. Filippova. Networked privacy
management in facebook: A mixed-methods and
multinational study. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM
Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work
& Social Computing, pages 503–514. ACM, 2016.
14. S. Clinch, N. Davies, M. Mikusz, P. Metzger,
M. Langheinrich, A. Schmidt, and G. Ward. Collecting
shared experiences through lifelogging: Lessons
learned. IEEE Pervasive Computing, 15(1):58–67, 2016.
15. N. Criado and J. M. Such. Implicit contextual integrity
in online social networks. Information Sciences,
325:48–69, 2015.
16. T. Denning, Z. Dehlawi, and T. Kohno. In situ with
bystanders of augmented reality glasses: Perspectives on
recording and privacy-mediating technologies. In
Proceedings of the 32nd annual ACM conference on
Human factors in computing systems, pages 2377–2386.
ACM, 2014.
17. M. Deutsch, P. T. Coleman, and E. C. Marcus. The
handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice.
John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
18. J. C. Flanagan. The critical incident technique.
Psychological bulletin, 51(4):327, 1954.
19. R. L. Fogues, P. Murukanniah, J. M. Such, and M. P.
Singh. Sharing policies in multiuser privacy scenarios:
Incorporating context, preferences, and arguments in
decision making. ACM Transactions on
Computer-Human Interaction, page In press., 2017.
20. U. Gadiraju, R. Kawase, S. Dietze, and G. Demartini.
Understanding malicious behavior in crowdsourcing
platforms: The case of online surveys. In Proceedings of
the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, pages 1631–1640. ACM, 2015.
21. H. Hu, G.-J. Ahn, and J. Jorgensen. Multiparty access
control for online social networks: model and
mechanisms. Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE
Transactions on, 25(7):1614–1627, 2013.
22. H. Hu, G.-J. Ahn, Z. Zhao, and D. Yang. Game theoretic
analysis of multiparty access control in online social
networks. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM symposium
on Access control models and technologies, pages
93–102. ACM, 2014.
23. P. Ilia, I. Polakis, E. Athanasopoulos, F. Maggi, and
S. Ioannidis. Face/off: Preventing privacy leakage from
photos in social networks. In Proceedings of the 22nd
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 781–792. ACM, 2015.
24. H. Jia and H. Xu. Autonomous and interdependent:
Collaborative privacy management on social networking
sites. In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages
4286–4297. ACM, 2016.
25. A. N. Joinson. Looking at, looking up or keeping up
with people?: motives and use of facebook. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, pages 1027–1036. ACM,
2008.
26. S. Kairam, M. Brzozowski, D. Huffaker, and E. Chi.
Talking in circles: selective sharing in google+. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors
in computing systems, pages 1065–1074. ACM, 2012.
27. D. Keku¨llu¨og˘lu, N. Ko¨kciyan, and P. Yolum. Strategies
for privacy negotiation in online social networks. In
Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on AI for
Privacy and Security, page 2. ACM, 2016.
28. M. Korayem, R. Templeman, D. Chen, and D. C. A.
Kapadia. Enhancing lifelogging privacy by detecting
screens. In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages
4309–4314. ACM, 2016.
29. H. Krasnova, S. Spiekermann, K. Koroleva, and
T. Hildebrand. Online social networks: why we disclose.
Journal of Information Technology, 25(2):109–125,
2010.
30. W. H. Kruskal and W. A. Wallis. Use of ranks in
one-criterion variance analysis. Journal of the American
statistical Association, 47(260):583–621, 1952.
31. A. Lampinen, V. Lehtinen, A. Lehmuskallio, and
S. Tamminen. We’re in it together: interpersonal
management of disclosure in social network services. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors
in computing systems, pages 3217–3226. ACM, 2011.
32. H. Lipford, A. Besmer, and J. Watson. Understanding
privacy settings in facebook with an audience view. In
Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Usability,
Psychology, and Security, pages 1–8. USENIX
Association Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008.
33. K. M. MacQueen, E. McLellan, K. Kay, and B. Milstein.
Codebook development for team-based qualitative
analysis. Cultural anthropology methods, 10(2):31–36,
1998.
34. B. Marder, A. Joinson, A. Shankar, and D. Houghton.
The extended chilling effect of facebook: The cold
reality of ubiquitous social networking. Computers in
Human Behavior, 60:582–592, 2016.
35. W. Mason and S. Suri. Conducting behavioral research
on amazons mechanical turk. Behavior research
methods, 44(1):1–23, 2012.
36. A. Mazzia, K. LeFevre, and E. Adar. The pviz
comprehension tool for social network privacy settings.
In Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security, page 13. ACM, 2012.
37. H. Nissenbaum. Privacy as contextual integrity. Wash. L.
Rev., 79:119, 2004.
38. L. Palen and P. Dourish. Unpacking privacy for a
networked world. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human factors in computing systems,
pages 129–136. ACM, 2003.
39. E. Peer, J. Vosgerau, and A. Acquisti. Reputation as a
sufficient condition for data quality on amazon
mechanical turk. Behav Res methods, pages 1–9, 2013.
40. S. Petronio. Boundaries of privacy: Dialectics of
disclosure. Suny Press, 2012.
41. S. Preibusch, B. Hoser, S. Gu¨rses, and B. Berendt.
Ubiquitous social networks–opportunities and
challenges for privacy-aware user modelling. In
Workshop on Data Mining for User Modelling at UM,
pages 50–62, 2007.
42. E. Rader, R. Wash, and B. Brooks. Stories as informal
lessons about security. In Proceedings of the Eighth
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, page 6.
ACM, 2012.
43. J. Saldan˜a. The coding manual for qualitative
researchers. Sage, 2015.
44. F. Schaub, B. Ko¨nings, and M. Weber. Context-adaptive
privacy: Leveraging context awareness to support
privacy decision making. IEEE Pervasive Computing,
14(1):34–43, 2015.
45. M. Sleeper, R. Balebako, S. Das, A. L. McConahy,
J. Wiese, and L. F. Cranor. The post that wasn’t:
exploring self-censorship on facebook. In Proceedings
of the 2013 conference on Computer supported
cooperative work, pages 793–802. ACM, 2013.
46. A. C. Squicciarini, M. Shehab, and F. Paci. Collective
privacy management in social networks. In Proceedings
of the 18th international conference on World wide web,
pages 521–530. ACM, 2009.
47. J. M. Such and N. Criado. Resolving multi-party privacy
conflicts in social media. IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering, 28(7):1851–1863,
2016.
48. J. M. Such and M. Rovatsos. Privacy policy negotiation
in social media. ACM Transactions on Autonomous and
Adaptive Systems, 11(1):4:1–4:29, 2016.
49. K. Thomas, C. Grier, and D. M. Nicol. unfriendly:
Multi-party privacy risks in social networks. In Privacy
Enhancing Technologies, pages 236–252. Springer,
2010.
50. K. W. Thomas. Conflict and conflict management:
Reflections and update. Journal of organizational
behavior, 13(3):265–274, 1992.
51. K. Vaniea and Y. Rashidi. Tales of software updates:
The process of updating software. In Proceedings of the
2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, pages 3215–3226. ACM, 2016.
52. J. Vitak, P. Wisniewski, X. Page, A. Lampinen, E. Litt,
R. De Wolf, P. G. Kelley, and M. Sleeper. The future of
networked privacy: Challenges and opportunities. In
Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference Companion
on Computer Supported Cooperative Work & Social
Computing, pages 267–272. ACM, 2015.
53. Y. Wang, P. G. Leon, A. Acquisti, L. F. Cranor,
A. Forget, and N. Sadeh. A field trial of privacy nudges
for facebook. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference
on human factors in computing systems, pages
2367–2376. ACM, 2014.
54. Y. Wang, P. G. Leon, K. Scott, X. Chen, A. Acquisti, and
L. F. Cranor. Privacy nudges for social media: an
exploratory facebook study. In Proceedings of the 22nd
International Conference on World Wide Web, pages
763–770. ACM, 2013.
55. P. Wisniewski, A. Islam, H. Richter Lipford, and D. C.
Wilson. Framing and measuring multi-dimensional
interpersonal privacy preferences of social networking
site users. Communications of the Association for
Information Systems, 38(1):10, 2016.
56. P. Wisniewski, H. Lipford, and D. Wilson. Fighting for
my space: Coping mechanisms for sns boundary
regulation. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages 609–618.
ACM, 2012.
57. P. Wisniewski, H. Xu, H. Lipford, and E. Bello-Ogunu.
Facebook apps and tagging: The trade-off between
personal privacy and engaging with friends. Journal of
the Association for Information Science and Technology,
66(9):1883–1896, 2015.
58. H. Xu. Reframing privacy 2.0 in online social network.
U. Pa. J. Const. L., 14:1077, 2011.
